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Overview
For the last 25 years, Somalis and international interlocutors 
concerned with state-building appear to have assumed 
that ‘clans’ are the core identity units in Somalia, bonded 
by primordial ties. However, the prevalent formula that 
redefines selected corporate lineage aggregations as 
political-territorial identity units is a historical contingency 
that needs to be explained.  Somalia has a segmentary lineage 
system in which the recognized four major Clans are a level 
of collective aggregation, both arbitrary and inconsistent, 
determined by contingencies external to the kinship system 
itself. This paper presents analysis of the processes that 
led to the emergence of the Clan-based political-military-
territorial units in the period 1987-92. It describes the 
transformations of pastoralism, specifically rangeland 
enclosure, and the resulting inter-communal armed conflicts 
and associated changes in the political significance of the 
lineage system. It describes the manipulation of lineage 
politics by Siyaad Barre as he sought to make his regime 
coup proof and the rivalries among the opposition leaders, 
which culminated in the formation of Clans as political 
units for the purposes of capturing state power. Those units 
proved intrinsically unstable and transient and, even with 
sustained efforts to find civic representatives of Clans who 
can share power, it is unsurprising that Clans are unsuited 
to serve as the basis for the reconstruction of the country.
December 2018
World Peace Foundation at The Fletcher 
School, Tufts University





London School of Economics 
and Political Science
Houghton Street
London, UK WC2A 2AE
 +44 (0)20 7405 7686
The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 2
Introduction
Understanding the dynamics that led to Soma-
lia’s ‘year zero’ in 19911 is more than a matter 
of history. The processes of socio-economic and 
political transformation that were underway in 
the years immediately prior to state collapse 
left an imprint on the country that endures 
more than 25 years later. In this paper I argue 
that the height of the civil war (approximate-
ly 1987-92) was a period in which the logic of 
identity politics was substantially altered. This 
happened through two processes. The first was 
the political organization of the means of vio-
lence in pursuit of state power (by both regime 
and armed opposition), and the second was the 
economic transformation in the pastoral social 
economy. The outcome of the first was the tran-
sient dominance of political-military-territori-
al units based on units that, in this paper, I call 
Clans (with a capital ‘C’). The result of the sec-
ond process was that these units were intrinsi-
cally unstable. Nonetheless, Clan units became and have remained the dominant framework 
for explaining Somali society and politics, and 
(despite strong complaints) they pervade per-
sistent international efforts to construct (or re-
construct) a functional state.
This paper draws primarily on unpublished 
research that I conducted in Somalia during 
1991-94, involving interviews with politicians, 
businesspeople, and civil society activists, into 
the political economy of the civil war, and re-
search using secondary literature on the polit-
ical economy of pastoralism. Returning to the 
research materials after 25 years, it is striking 
how much remains relevant today. The ques-
tion that motivated my initial research—what 
is the United Somali Congress, the force that de-
stroyed Mogadishu?—has not been adequately 
1  Cf. Clapham 2017.
2  The research was interrupted by the Rwanda genocide. The African Rights discussion paper, ‘Grass 
and the Roots of Peace’ (African Rights 1994) was completed in April 1994 but only circulated to a 
limited audience. In the list of published discussion papers, its place as number 3 was taken by a paper on 
Rwanda.
3  The term ‘clan cleansing’ was first used with reference to north-western Somalia by Jama Ghalib 
(1995, p. 187).
answered. My hypothesis, that it sprang in part 
from the traumatic ruptures of the pastoral 
economy, remains worthy of inquiry.2
The terminology of ‘clan’ is pervasive in Soma-
lia and some clarification is needed. The word 
‘clan’ is used in an elastic manner, to refer to 
corporate lineage groups at any number of dif-
ferent levels of aggregation. Thus, the Ayr, the 
Habr Gidir and the Hawiye are all labeled as 
‘clans’, despite the fact that each one is a sub-
section of the next. If used in such a malleable 
and contextual manner, the term ‘clan’ can thus 
explain everything and nothing. The word is 
also used to refer to units that, in other African 
contexts, would have been termed ‘tribes’ or 
‘ethnic groups’. In this paper, I reserve the word 
Clan for these units—the capital ‘C’ indicating 
their status as historically produced. To mini-
mize confusion, I use the (somewhat clunky) 
terminology of ‘corporate lineage groups’ to 
refer to any other formation. When I use the 
word ‘clan’ it is either in a direct quotation of 
others’ work or in the everyday elastic and in-
determinate sense of the word.
The period 1987-92 was the most violent in 
Somalia’s modern history. While a number of 
memoirs and journalists’ accounts were pub-
lished at that time, the events of that year have 
only recently been subject of more critical 
scholarly scrutiny. Notably, Lidwien Kapteijns 
has detailed the ‘clan cleansing’ of Mogadishu 
and its legacy (Kapteijns 2013).3 Episodes of 
extreme violence such as this have the charac-
teristic of appearing to speed up history and 
warp time. Within a relatively short time pe-
riod, many momentous events occurred, with 
impacts that reverberate up to today. Moreover, 
as noted by Donald Donham (2007), episodes 
of extreme violence tend to ‘primordialize’ the 
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collective identities and hatreds that existed at 
the moment of violence, projecting those iden-tities and hatreds into the past and thereby 
obscuring, and perhaps even inverting, the law 
of cause and effect. Thus, because the episodes 
of anti-Isaaq violence of 1988 and the Hawi-
ye-Darood violence of 1991 were so important 
in defining subsequent identities and polari-
ties, the events leading up to those battles and 
massacres tend to be seen through the lens of 
Hawiye and Darood Clan units. This is an error, 
which in this paper I try to correct. 
In his account of the United Somali Congress 
(USC) and its role in bringing down the regime 
of Mohamed Siyaad Barre, Omer Elmi (1993) 
writes of the ‘prairie fire’ of violence that 
burned among the pastoralists of the central 
rangelands, which spread at last to Mogadishu. 
Elmi is avowedly partisan but the details he 
provides of the USC’s foundational conference 
appear to be factually accurate. He describes 
‘guerrilla’ delegates from a number of ‘bases’ 
who congregated at a garrison in Ethiopia to 
anoint their leader (General Mohamed Farah 
Aideed). He candidly notes that they were al-
ready armed and mobilized before the arrival 
of their leader. The ‘bases’ and ‘guerrilla units’ 
he lists map precisely onto groups of self-armed 
pastoralists, who had organized themselves in-
crementally over the previous ten years in or-
der to protect their livestock, fight for access to 
grazing land, and raid others. These were the 
foot soldiers of the USC-Aideed who ransacked 
much of Mogadishu in 1991 and 1992. Follow-
ing a discussion of lineage and identity politics 
in Somalia, the first substantive part of this pa-
per describes how these local conflicts arose.
The Hawiye Clan identity of these groups was 
the product of Aideed’s burning political am-
bition to seize state power—the other ‘prairie 
fire’ that consumed Somalia. Many others also 
sought state power and used much the same 
mechanism to try to achieve it. But both regime 
and opposition lacked institutions and rule-
bound procedures for regulating such rivalrous 
ambitions. President Mohamed Siyaad Barre 
dismantled military and civilian-administra-
tive institutions to preserve his personal pow-
er. In parallel opposition leaders, for reasons of 
political tactics, chose not to establish institu-
tions—and indeed, those that existed within 
the first and most potent opposition front, the 
Somali National Movement (SNM), were shat-
tered by military calamity in 1988.
Beginning with this period, one of the remark-
able aspects of the Somali political crisis is that 
many analysts and almost all policymakers use 
the term ‘clan’ as though it refers to a natural 
unit, despite the fact that historians and social 
scientists have—with a few notable excep-
tions—long ago abandoned such primordialist 
frameworks. A singular and fixed formula of 
‘clan’ identity is simultaneous decried as ma-
lign and invoked as unavoidable. ‘Clans’ are his-
torically constituted and are used by members 
of the country’s political and military elites as 
instruments of power—seeking state power 
and disciplining their constituents. They are 
used by external intervenors for political and 
(especially) military purposes. Given that con-
temporary conflicts in Africa and the Middle 
East almost always take on an ethnic character, 
it is not surprising that Somalia’s civil war in 
the 1980s should have become an ethnic con-
flict. What needs to be explained is when and 
why the particular configuration of collective 
entities emerged that are known as Clans, and 
why they persisted.
The central claim of this paper is that Clan has 
served as handmaiden to the construction of 
the current Somali political-territorial con-
figuration much as ‘nation’ did to the modern 
European state system (c.f. Gellner 2006). Clan 
cannot be taken for granted. It has been formed 
through violent and extractive processes at the 
intersection of pastoral livelihoods, military 
organization and spoils politics as a strategy 
for seeking and sustaining political power. But 
identities also have their own autonomous sub-
stance and logic, and in Somalia this demands 
that we analyze the lineage system, its speci-
ficities and the function played by narratives 
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around ‘clan’. Ironically, it was attempts by civ-
ic leaders and foreign mediators to circumvent 
or marginalize Somalia’s warlords that subse-
quently formalized the Clan system—a back-
handed complement to the hegemony achieved 
by the violent processes of Clan formation.
The starting point for analysis of Somali identi-
ty is I.M. Lewis’s classic ethnography, A Pastoral 
Democracy (Lewis 1961). It is the intellectual 
point of origin for the conventional parsing of 
the Somali ‘total lineage’ into what Lewis called 
four clan families, their constituent clans, sub-
clans, and sub-sub clans. These terms have 
subsequently been used loosely and confusing-
ly, and I will avoid this classification.
Lewis did his fieldwork in the last years of colo-
nial rule and his book was a product of that his-
torical moment. In common with the pioneer-
ing generation of British social anthropologists, 
the colonial state is both ubiquitous and invis-
ible in Lewis’s monograph. Late colonial eth-
nographies such as this were an integral part 
of the administrative tribalism that the British 
Empire bequeathed to the first generation of 
post-colonial leaders, and these writings influ-
enced their thinking for both good and ill. Thus, 
General Mohamed Farah Aideed cites Lewis’s 
framework as authoritative (Ruhela 1994, pp. 
150-1). Throughout this paper I follow Lidwien 
Kapteijns (2010) in regarding it as an invented 
and largely malign tradition. However, we will 
also come across cases in which this framework 
served as a useful fiction, lending authority to 
arguments for civility, notably in the construc-
tion of Somaliland. Thirty years on, in Blood and Bone, Lewis ar-
gued that his analysis applied wholly un-
changed as the central explanation for civil war 
and collapse of the state (Lewis 1994). Such 
unreformed primordialism cannot be taken se-
riously. It is also inherently ‘groupist’ in that it 
attributes agency to social units (c.f. Brubaker 
2009), transgressing the principle that ‘clan’ is 
an expression of lineage relations rather than 
a property of collective units. 
Most recent scholarship on the 
history and politics of Somali 
identities has focused on the 
non-nomadic peoples of south-
ern Somalia who have histori-
cally been politically marginal-
ized and whose lineage system 
has been seen as a deficient 
version of the ‘pure’ northern 
Somali version, or who are not 
‘Somali’ by lineage at all. This 
is an important corrective to 
the dominant narration of So-
mali identities. In this paper, 
however, the focus is more 
narrowly on those historically 
dominant pastoralist groups 
themselves—the very same communities that 
Lewis studied, namely the Isaaq and Darood 
pastoralists of northern Somalia and the Haw-
iye of the central rangelands—and how their 
identities have been reconstructed. 
Lewis was a sufficiently diligent ethnographer 
that his material is much richer than might be 
inferred from the pared-down primordialism 
that he and his acolytes have advocated. Lew-
is’s book still provides a useful starting point 
for understanding the Somali lineage sys-
tem and its historical corollaries, notably xeer 
Source: Lewis 1994.
Figure 1: Conventional parsing of the Somali lineage system
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(‘contract’).4 Interestingly, it gives no pointers 
to the future of Clan conflict. To re-state, in this 
paper, I use Clan to refer to the level of lineage 
aggregation most salient for political purposes, 
constituted as the basic element of armed con-
flict and ethno-nationalism. In the 1950s, Clans 
were convenient for colonial administrative 
tribalism, but other levels of lineage identity 
(sub-clan and dia-paying group) retained their 
social reality and political potential. Clans only 
became the politically dominant aggregation at 
a later time. 
There is nothing in the Somali lineage system 
that preordained that any one level of cor-
porate lineage association should be para-
mount. The four major Clans are an arbitrary 
construct. And indeed, as levels of corporate 
lineage association, they do not match one 
another evenly. The three major pastoral lin-
eages are Hawiye, Diir/Isaaq and Darood; but 
the most commonly usages of ‘clan’ are for the 
Isaaq and for subsets of the Darood: the Dul-
bahante, Majerteen, Marehaan and Ogadeen. 
Meanwhile the Harti (consisting of principally 
of the Dulbahante, Majerteen and Warsengeli) 
is the salient level of corporate association in 
Kismaayo. All the units in figure 2 have been la-
4  Pronounced heer and written that way prior to the establishment of the Somali script in 1972.
beled as clans at one point or another. Howev-
er, while scholars have increasingly questioned 
primordialized accounts of Clan, they have paid 
less attention to why Somalia is dominated by 
this specific configuration of Clan-based po-
litical-military-territorial formations. Indeed, 
otherwise-astute analysts of how clan has been 
constructed have accepted this formula. Thus 
Abdisalam Issa Salwe advocates ‘clan balanc-
ing’ as a remedy for clan domination (Issa-Sal-
we 1996, p. 134) and Alice Hashim advocates 
‘clan self-rule’ (Hashim 1997). One of the rea-
sons for their advocacy is that by invoking Clan, 
they can generate a formula for representation 
in peace talks and political structures that is 
based on something other than military force 
(Menkhaus et al. 2009, pp. 44-5).
I follow Abdi Samatar (1992), Daniel Compag-
non (1998) and Lidwien Kapteijns (2013) in lo-
cating this inflection point somewhere during 
the zenith of the Mohamed Siyaad Barre’s op-
pression and the depths of the civil war and the 
mass atrocities that accompanied it. At the mo-
ment of the final battle for state power in Jan-
uary 1991—which was also in retrospect the 
moment of state collapse—there were three 
Figure 2. Somali total lineage
Source: adapted from Abbink 2009.
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main armed movements, namely the Somali 
National Movement (SNM—‘Isaaq’), the Unit-
ed Somali Congress (USC—‘Hawiye’) and the 
Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM—‘Ogadeen’). 
Others had recently formed, namely the Soma-
li Democratic Movement (SDM—‘Reewin’ or 
‘Rahanweyn’) and Southern Somali National 
Movement (SSNM—‘Diir’), while the Soma-
li Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF—‘Ma-
jerteen’) had been revived from a moribund 
state. The Somali National Front (SNF—‘Mare-
han’) was created from remnants of the re-
gime. These were, I argue, the vehicles for the 
political-military-territorial units, identified as 
Clan, that have dominated ever since. In invok-
ing Clan, the political-military entrepreneurs 
made an implicit bargain with the custodians 
of Clan identity, but erroneously assumed that 
they would be masters of that bargain. Subse-
quently, at peace conferences in 1996 in Sodere 
(Ethiopia) and 2000 in Arta (Djibouti), media-
tors and civic leaders turned that logic against 
the warlords by appealing directly to Clan el-
ders, and fastening onto Clan-based represen-
tation formulae that culminated in the ‘4.5’ 
specification (Menkhaus et al. 2009). The ‘4.5’ 
are constituted by the four big Clans: Daarood, 
Diir (including Isaaq), Hawiye and Reewin/
Rahanweyn (Digil and Mirifle); with a half (or 
‘fifth clan’) allocated to minority groups. While 
this was an effective tactic for marginalizing 
the armed factions, and possibly the best way 
of securing representation for minorities, it has 
formalized the legacy of Clan formation. It has 
subsequently been translated into a constitu-
tionally-sanctioned allocation of power accord-
ing to the ‘4.5’ formula and a territorial division 
into the ‘building blocks’ of Federal Member 
States that matches it, albeit unevenly.5 
The violent episodes of 1987-92 were un-
doubtedly crucial in fixing the narrative of Clan 
identity and Clan hatred, and severing cross-
clan ties, in such a way that a turn to civic rep-
resentation could not reverse these new reali-
ties. However, following Donham’s enjoinder to 
5  Each of the Federal Member States has a dominant ‘clan’ and significant numbers of minorities and 
trans-state communities (those with a presence across state boundaries). 
try to understand violent events in their cor-
rect sequence, it is important also to attend to 
what happened immediately beforehand. Why 
did Clan emerge as the organizing framework 
for the insurgency? This paper seeks to answer 
this question. 
Lineage and ‘Clan’
However much they are politically instru-
mentalised, socio-political identities also have 
their own autonomous logics. When a politi-
cian appeals to identity as the basis for polit-
ical mobilization he is making a pact with the 
custodians of identity, such as tribal chiefs or 
sectarian religious authorities. In most societ-
ies, those custodians have social constituencies 
and hold to systems of values and beliefs that provide them with some autonomy vis-à-vis 
the politicians. Along with the way in which 
episodes of extreme violence generate identity 
configurations, this is one of the core dynamics 
of identity-construction in a situation of polit-
ical contestation and armed conflict. However, 
segmentary lineage systems allocate authority 
over identity in an egalitarian manner, which 
means that politicians and businesspeople can 
themselves be effective identity entrepreneurs, 
without having to appeal to custodians of iden-
tity who possess autonomous authority. 
Somalia is a paradigmatic example of a segmen-
tary lineage system. It is a simple and elegant 
system in which each identity-based corporate 
association corresponds precisely to a genera-
tional level of the patriliny (Lewis 1961). This 
is encapsulated in the formula, ‘me against my 
brother; me and my brother against our cous-
in; me and my cousins against the stranger.’ All 
members of the main pastoral clans can trace 
descent from a common ancestor within a ‘total 
genealogy’. The highest, most unifying levels of 
this genealogy appear to have been established 
in the nineteenth century at the time of resis-
tance to imperial encroachment (Ahmed 1995; 
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Cassanelli 2010, p. 60). There are many fic-
tions in the higher levels of the genealogy and 
telescoping of the generations (Mansur 1995; 
Abbink 2009). Somalis have a vocabulary that 
refers to different levels of lineage organiza-
tion, including terms such as qabiil (generically 
used for identity unit), reer (‘family’), jilib and 
laaf (lower levels of lineage grouping). It has 
become solely a matter of convention to name 
certain levels of lineage as ‘subclans’, ‘clans’ 
and ‘clan families’, as though they correspond-
ed in some manner to ‘ethnicity’ or ‘tribe’. The 
total genealogy means that each male mem-
ber of the main pastoral Somali lineages is in 
principle able to choose the lineage-based unit 
of solidarity from the level of the immediate 
family to that of the Somali people as a whole, 
with units such as ‘clans’ becoming salient on 
a circumstantial or arbitrary basis. It is a dem-
ocratic patriliny: all adult males in the gene-
alogy have, in theory, equal standing. When a 
man’s name attaches to a lineage formation 
at any level (‘clan’, ‘sub-clan’, etc.) that occurs 
solely because he achieved prominence as an 
individual, through political, military, social or 
economic proficiency. We must not conflate 
or confuse two different things: ‘clan’ as rela-
tionship and ‘clan’ as unit. One is individuals’ 
general affinity with their lineages; the other is 
individuals’ purported singular identification 
with a Clan.
The simplicity of segmentary lineage conceals 
four vitally important aspects. First, the con-
tent of what is at stake in the lineage system 
changes with level (cf. Simons 1995, p. 138). In 
the pastoralist system as it existed during the 
colonial era, the fundamental unit of identity 
was the mutual assistance association among 
patrilineal kin, organized for the purposes of 
paying or obtaining bloodwealth (dia) as rec-
ompense for homicide. For obvious practical 
purposes, this used to limit the dia-paying 
group to a relatively restricted span of kin—four to eight generations, a few hundred to a 
few thousand men—who are within a geo-
graphical range (Lewis 1961, p. 6). Implicitly, 
it identifies the dia-paying group with a group 
that can be mobilized militarily. This constraint 
does not scale easily: as the level moves higher 
in the genealogical tree, the sentiment of soli-
darity remains, but its mechanics vary. As Ro-
land Marchal observes, the internal function of 
lineage units is diverse: ‘history, migration and 
urbanization …  have made each clan very dis-
tinct, even while they claim many commonali-
ties’ (2007, p. 1098).
Note that there is a danger of circularity in at-
tributing conflict to lineage units, as the func-
tion of these units may be to organize violence 
and reconcile after violence. The dia-paying 
group is a paradigmatic example of this. It il-
lustrates the phenomenon of how the antici-
pated mechanism of resolving the conflict de-
fines the formation of the conflict parties. In 
the era when the localized dia-paying group 
was the most salient form of lineage organiza-
tion, then when there was a potentially violent 
conflict, the participants would enter it in the 
knowledge that the final settlement would be negotiated between dia-paying groups. Any 
individual participating in that conflict would 
be liable for contributing to dia-payments or 
his family would be eligible for receiving such 
compensation only insofar as he participated as a member of a dia-paying group. In a similar 
way, in the contemporary era of Clans, military 
commanders and militiamen justifiably antic-
ipate that ceasefires and political settlements 
will be negotiated on the basis of Clans, and so 
will participate accordingly. Conflict and iden-
tity units are mutually constitutive; neither is 
logically prior to the other.
Second, kinship is necessarily leavened by com-
plementary institutions of contract-making. In 
In a similar way, in the contemporary 
era of Clans, military commanders and 
militiamen justifiably anticipate that 
ceasefires and political settlements will 
be negotiated on the basis of Clans, and 
so will participate accordingly.
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the customary system as described in Lewis, 
this was ‘a form of social contract’ known as 
xeer. Lewis describes it in these terms: ‘All lin-
eages which act corporately do so first because 
of their agnatic basis, and secondly through an 
explicit treaty defining the terms of their col-
lective unity.’ (Lewis 1961, p. 3) Typically, it was the dia-paying group that is the contract-
ing unit. While the dia-paying units that came together through xeer were usually from the 
same clan or clan family, there was no auto-
matic solidarity, but rather a deliberate pro-
cess of negotiation that allowed for groups to 
be approached or not approached, and to opt in 
or out. There was also no restriction on which 
dia-paying groups can be approached to form 
a contract. Lewis writes, ‘it is possible to have 
treaty obligations and political solidarity with-
out agnation’ (p. 193). For example, one kind of 
contract (gashaanbur) was among a coalition 
of small lineages, to resist the power of a bigger 
one (Compagnon 1998, p. 84). 
There can be other bases for making contracts 
and creating corporate associations, for exam-
ple Islamic law and practice, or administrative 
arrangements associated with the state. In the 
last half century, customary forms of xeer have 
changed, either merging into or being replaced 
by other forms of civil, commercial and political 
transactions and agreements. The dia-paying 
group remains significant but has become de-
tached from its basis in local pastoralist orga-
nization. Instead, the dia-paying group is fused 
with other networks of solidarity, among them 
business-commercial ties, and the organiza-
tion of political and economic rewards around 
Clans and other forms of lineage solidarity that 
raise funds for common activities. The group 
that organizes the collection of payments for 
dia and other obligations is known as qaraan, 
which can be more flexible than solely follow-
ing the lineage principle to the boundaries of the dia-paying group, and may include friends 
and the wider clan (Simons 1995: 120-122). 
The lineage principle animates all these forms 
of solidarity, but none of them presuppose a 
fixed identity unit.
Third, the ‘classic’ segmentary lineage mode of 
social organization is closely associated with a 
particular form of livelihood, namely nomadic 
pastoralism. This customarily has a particular 
form of territorial organization, according to 
which grazing lands are a common resource, 
and access and utilization of the rangeland 
is based on negotiation among the collective 
groups that organize herds of livestock. Wa-
ter ownership and access varies: in the case of 
wells and reservoirs it is organised according 
to who dug and maintained them. Historically, 
land was plentiful but water and grazing re-
sources were dispersed, seasonal and variable 
from one year to the next. As recently as 1970, 
most Somali herds were kept primarily for 
subsistence. Few animals were sold, reflecting 
the pastoralists’ dependence on the direct con-
sumption of milk rather than the sale of animals 
to obtain money with which to buy other com-
modities (British Veterinary Team 1973). Oth-
er main reasons for removing animals from the 
herd were bridewealth and dia payment, the 
slaughter of animals for religious feasts and to 
honour guests, and changing the composition 
of the herd. The lineage system becomes more 
complex in the south, and especially among the 
historically settled peoples of the inter-riveri-
an areas, where livelihoods were historically 
based on a combination farming and livestock 
herding. As Abdi Samatar observes, the first or-
der of intellectual business in updating Lewis’s 
Pastoral Democracy should be to focus on that 
imprecise word ‘pastoralism’ and analyse how 
it has been transformed by the commodifica-
tion of livestock and the means for sustaining 
them (Samatar 1992, pp. 627, 631).
Finally, lineage identity does not exist in a polit-
ical vacuum. Segmentary lineages are the clas-
sic example of a self-governing society without 
a state; but to the extent that such statelessness 
ever existed, it was incomplete and occurred 
only in a particular context. Where there is an 
important presence of a state or a commercial 
entity, the significance of lineage changes. A po-
litically significant individual becomes a broker 
between the state and the lineage. Offices such 
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as sultan and ugaas usually emerged in these 
circumstances. Lineages as such cannot be rep-
resented in power structures. Rather, individu-
als have posts in hierarchies of military power, 
administration and patronage, which intersect 
with their positions in their lineages.
In the 1950s, the northern Somali lineage sys-
tem engaged with the colonial power, howev-
er much the ethnographer might have tried to 
make the colonial impact invisible. In much the 
same way that ‘tribes’ emerged from the colo-
nial encounter as a means of making African so-
cieties legible to imperial authorities and pro-
viding the means to administer them indirectly 
(Ranger 1983; Mamdani 1996), the framework 
of ‘clan’ was a military-administrative conve-
nience for defining colonial subjecthood. In the 
post-colonial era, the lineage system interacts 
with other political ethnicities (in southern 
Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya), with domestic 
state authorities, and with international pow-
ers. And, it is under pressure to conform to the 
standard model of modern state formation (Sa-
matar 1988).
One significant element in the Somali segmen-
tary lineage system is, however, difficult to 
change. As noted, and in contrast to forms of 
ethnicity that prevail in agrarian societies those 
in which customary systems have been adapt-
ed and validated by state authority, the Somali 
lineage system has no privileged specialist cus-
todians of identity. There are no chiefly offices 
tied to land, spiritual authority or aristocratic 
lineage. All adult males possess, in principle, 
equal legitimate claim to public authority. Any-
one of a certain age and mental capacity can be 
an ‘elder’: it is a normative term that refers to 
someone who acts in a certain way, rather than 
a descriptor of an office. Individuals who hold 
chiefly titles such as Ugaas or Sultan, do so in-
sofar as they carry out the functions of the po-
sition; their status may be heritable but hold-
ing the office is ultimately based on individual 
merit and collective agreement. The egalitari-
anism of the lineage system has important im-
plications for how Clan has been politicized.
In other contexts, we can depict the instrumen-
talization of ethnicity as a bargain between 
politicians who wish to utilize identity for their 
own purposes, and the custodians of legitimate 
identity, who have their own interests and con-
straints (which can be extremely diverse). The 
degree to which identity politics is regulated depends on the authority and interests of those 
custodians, which are in varying degrees inde-
pendent from the politicians. In the pastoral 
Somali case, where no such autonomous custo-
dians of identity have historically existed, any 
adult male can aspire to become recognized as 
a lineage leader and the only mechanisms for 
restraint or regulation are his peers. This rec-
ognition can arise through political-military 
prowess and reputation, through personal in-
tegrity and respect, through riches, through 
serving as a broker with an external political 
entity, or a combination of the above. During 
the post-colonial period, political-economic 
developments pressed the Somali lineage sys-
tem to generate forms of political identity com-
patible with state formation. This allows us to 
begin to understand the dynamics of intensely 
competitive Clan formation, driven by the vi-
olent rivalries among political entrepreneurs 
and the (weaker) efforts of ‘elders’, espousing 
norms of civility, to restrain them. The logic of 
lineage could be mobilized with equal legitima-
cy by all these actors in such contests—and in-
deed a single individual could switch between 
different roles in accordance with contingency 
and choice.
The formation of Clans through the process-
es described in this paper, however, have also 
created the positions of identity custodians. 
Alongside political-military entrepreneurs, ‘el-
ders’ have begun to emerge as respected repre-
sentatives of Clans. The mechanisms for identi-
fying these representatives are critical. Notably, 
the 2000 Arta peace conference where each 
Clan was asked to nominate 180 individuals 
(160 men and 20 women), was a pivotal case. 
In Ethiopia, the principle of ‘nationality’ has 
been incorporated into political organization 
since the 1970s and forms a central and con-
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troversial element in the 1995 Federal Consti-
tution. This recognises Somalis as a constituent 
nationality of the Ethiopian federation, where 
they have the intriguingly named Ethiopian 
Somali National Regional State. By extension, 
Somali Clans are also recognized as constitu-
ent elements of the Somali nation, implicitly a 
theorization of ‘segmentary nationalism’ (c.f. 
Lewis 1989) that has informed Ethiopian pol-
icy towards Somalia since 1991. Among other 
things this has contributed to Ethiopia’s pref-
erence for a ‘building blocks’ approach and its 
advocacy of formulae based on equal political 
status for Clans in Ethiopian-sponsored peace 
processes, such as the 1996 Sodere conference 
(Menkhaus et al. 2009, p. 14). By recognizing 
Clans as administrative entities, the Ethiopians 
have elevated Clan elders and administrators 
into privileged guardians of Clan identity, solid-
ifying the preconceptions of those who articu-
lated the framework in the first place.
The Transformation of 
Pastoralist Livelihoods
The first element in the origins of the ‘prai-
rie fire’ is how disruptive changes in the pas-
toral economy created what might be called 
a proto-insurrection—poorly coordinated 
forms of violent resistance and intercommu-
nal conflict—before any organized insurgency 
emerged.
The ‘ideal type’ of Somali lineage organization, 
as enscribed in the ethnographic canon, existed 
at a time when the basis of livelihoods—live-
stock ownership—was widely distributed and 
organized by families and dia-paying groups, 
and Somalis political ambitions were limited 
by colonial rule. The transformation in pasto-
ralism was the first factor in reshaping iden-
tities and the emergence of the post-colonial 
‘clan’.
Between the early 1970s and the late 1980s, 
traditional forms of pastoral livelihoods were 
transformed. There was a rapid commercial-
ization of livestock ownership and a huge land 
grab. Four main factors drove these changes: 
growth in numbers, commercialization and 
associated social stratification, changing land 
use, and politics and war. The ‘great Somali 
land grab’ of the 1980s drove a series of pasto-
ral land conflicts that were pivotal in shaping 
the ways in which violence, politics and ‘clan’ 
identities were organized.
Growth in numbers of livestock. A huge in-
crease in numbers of camels, sheep, goats and 
cattle was related to the commercial orienta-tion of herders, the growth of veterinary fa-
cilities, increased provision of water and the 
expanding human population. The result was 
that, in contradiction to the historical combi-
nation of water scarcity and plentiful pasture, 
grazing became increasingly scarce, while wa-
ter was relatively abundant. In turn, there was 
an overall deterioration in the quality of the 
range, particularly the depletion of the most 
favoured species of grass. One result was that 
Source: University of Texas
Map 1. Land use in Somalia
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pasture became a scarce resource, and private 
ownership of pasture grew. Perhaps the most 
striking development in the 1980s was the 
widespread private enclosure of the range. In 
the traditional nomadic economy, herders and 
their livestock could move freely, subject only 
to negotiation with others in the vicinity. Fenc-
ing the grazing lands would have been unthink-
able. The rapid spread of thorn fences across 
the rangelands, enclosing land claimed as pri-
vate, was an indicator of a dramatic change in 
the territoriality of Somalia’s political economy.
Commercialization. From the 1970s to the 
1990s, Somalia’s livestock economy followed 
a dramatic sequence of boom, bust and boom. The bust was brought about by government 
restrictions on exports, droughts (1974-75 
and 1986-87), and war. The background was 
the fast growth in the commercial export of 
livestock which came to dominate the pasto-
ral economy in the 1970s and 1980s, reaching 
to even the most remote parts of Somalia. The 
livestock trade was the main motor of social 
and economic trade among Somali pastoral-
ists before the war. It had a profound impact 
on herding patterns and on resource use, and 
played a central role in shaping the conflicts 
that arose. The trade itself was a major eco-
nomic resource, and thus a focus of conflict be-
tween the government and its opponents.
By the mid-1980s, commercial pastoralism 
dominated over traditional livestock herding. 
The trading sector was highly dynamic and ex-
panding rapidly. The marketing structure that 
developed was highly sophisticated, and (in 
the north and centre of the country) adapted 
to the peculiar demands of the market in the 
Arabian peninsular. The majority of the mar-
keted animals were exported, and were sent to 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen, in particular for the 
Haj market. This made the market highly sea-
sonal, and concentrated commercial activity on 
a single trade route (through Berbera) at a sin-
gle time of year, that shifts by eleven days each 
year in accordance with the Islamic calendar. 
The southern livestock market was focused on 
Mogadishu and Kenya.
Another unique feature of Somali pastoralism 
is its credit arrangements, whereby middlemen 
are paid by exporters only when their animals 
are sold in the destination market. This was a 
mechanism for concentrating livestock own-
ership among the wealthy. In the 1980s, most 
animals on the range were owned by brokers, 
middlemen and export traders, who employed 
young men as herders. Those businessmen 
co-opted the lineage system for their purpos-
es. The traditional small-scale organization of 
the lineage system was changed to one of com-
mercially-owned herds, with traders and their 
agents making the key decisions concerning 
management and sale. If animals were stolen 
or herders killed, the businessman would in-
voke lineage solidarity and perhaps mobilize the dia-paying group to resolve the dispute, 
but these actions clearly would hold a different 
meaning to their invocation by members of a 
lineage acting in solidarity with one another.
The monetization of the herders’ economy was 
a closely related phenomenon, which arose 
from the increasing sale of animals, combined 
with improving terms of trade between live-
stock and consumable goods such as grain. It 
led to a marked change in herders’ lifestyles 
and diet; instead of being primarily depen-
dent on meat and milk, herders bought larger 
amounts of foodstuffs from the market, includ-
ing sugar, tea and cereals, and also purchased 
other consumer goods. The major source of 
income was sale of livestock. But a growing 
number of poorer rural people also began to 
engage in economic activities that brought 
in small amounts of money, with which they 
would buy essential commodities. The growth 
The rapid spread of thorn fences across 
the rangelands, enclosing land claimed 
as private, was an indicator of a dramatic 
change in the territoriality of Somalia’s 
political economy.  
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of the low-income monetized informal sector 
in towns, and the growth of small trading cen-
tres, was very noticeable.
A consequence was intensified economic strat-
ification. Pastoralist societies are commonly in-
equitable, and dominated by small numbers of 
wealthy herders. In the late 1970s and 1980s, 
a new phenomenon in Somalia was the chron-
ic inability of smaller herders to sustain them-
selves, with resulting impoverishment. This 
was made worse by serious livestock losses 
during the 1987 drought. The consequences 
included widespread indebtedness, outmigra-
tion, and livelihood diversification.
Changing land use. The most important factor 
in driving changing use of pastureland was the 
rapid development of year-round water provi-
sion. In the traditional Somali nomadic pasto-
ral system, water rights were more developed 
than grazing rights. This reflected the relative 
scarcity of water and the investment required 
to dig a well or a reservoir, and to maintain it. 
Thus, complex systems of water rights evolved. 
The individual or lineage who dug the well 
were said to own the well, and hence to have 
first right to the water, but these rights did not 
extend to refusing water to others, if it were 
available.
The provision of improved water supplies 
became a political and economic priority for 
successive governments and international aid 
programmes. Officials in the Siyaad Barre gov-ernment rewarded their supporters by provid-
ing deep bore holes with mechanical pumps or 
excavating public reservoirs. The rapid spread 
of water supplies across the rangelands rad-
ically changed the nature of pastoralism. Wa-
ter became relatively plentiful all year around. This meant that many areas that were pre-
viously unusable, could be grazed, and areas 
that previously could be grazed only in the wet 
season, were now open for year-round grazing. 
This increased the pressure on pastures and 
led many pastoral communities to reconsider their attitude towards the provision of water 
supplies—a well or reservoir could spell the 
intrusion of herds belonging to other clans or 
big traders into what had previously been a 
wet season reserve for local herds.
Herders had some difficulty in communicating 
their scepticism about the value of improved 
water supplies to the agencies responsible 
for providing water ‘development.’ One of the 
first priorities of the Central Rangelands De-
velopment Project (CRDP) after its inaugura-
tion in 1983 was the provision of permanent 
water sources in areas prone to water short-
age. At Budbud in Bulo Burte district of Hiraan 
region, Hawadle pastoralists rejected plans 
for the agency GTZ to drill a borehole in their 
seasonal pastures in 1984. They feared they 
would lose exclusive use of this land. When 
the GTZ engineer nevertheless started drill-
ing, they attacked and killed him. Similarly, in 
1986, Ogaden herders in Afmadow in the Low-
er Jubba lobbied against the further develop-
ment of water resources in their area, fearing 
the encroachment of other herds. The fear was 
well-founded: Marehan herders began to use 
the water and grazing resources, leading to 
conflict.
During the war, many deep bore holes and res-
ervoirs became inoperable due to lack of spare 
parts and maintenance. For some pastoralists, 
this was not unwelcome. In some areas, herders 
refused to ask for their water supplies to be re-
habilitated, fearing that this would spark con-
flict. A key water point near Zeila in Somaliland 
remained unrepaired until 1994, at the request 
of the local Issa and Gadabursi herders, on ac-
count of fears of conflict.
Politics and war. The Siyaad Barre government 
repeatedly intervened in the rangelands in sup-
port of certain clans. This was the key factor in 
escalating local disputes that would otherwise 
have been resolved by mediation among the 
parties concerned, into intractable conflicts 
of a national political nature. Fomenting such 
disputes was part of Siyaad Barre’s divide-and-
rule strategy. The resolution of these conflicts 
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ultimately depended on the overthrow of the 
government. Several of these disputes will be 
described below.
In turn, the armed conflicts contributed to a 
further assault on the social and economic 
base of pastoralism. War began by disrupting 
the trading systems; as it intensified, pasto-
ral movement was disrupted by sowing land 
mines, by the destruction of water supplies, 
and by the requisitioning and slaughter of 
livestock by the Somali army and later by the 
militias. Some of the government counter-in-
surgency strategy was specifically aimed at 
rendering pastoralism unviable: the theory 
was that once the herders had been forced to 
abandon their herds, the guerrillas could no 
longer exist in the rural areas. It did this by tar-
geting migration routes and seasonal pastures 
for mining, by blowing up water points, and by 
mounting rural patrols that terrorized herders 
and confiscated their animals. The collapse of 
veterinary services also contributed to the cri-
sis of pastoralism. The Somali army destroyed 
considerable areas of forest in order to deny 
insurgents the opportunity of using the natural 
cover provided by trees.
As a consequence of all the above, rural peo-
ple moved out of traditional forms of nomad-
ic pastoralism. They moved to cities, as labour 
migrants to Arab countries, became agro-pas-
toralists, or became part of a massive dis-
possession of farmland in other parts of the 
country. Most immediately important for the 
changing geography of clan, was the growth in 
agro-pastoral livelihoods that mixed livestock 
herding and cultivation. This was one driver in 
a huge land grab: a development that demands 
special attention.
The Great Somali Land Grab
The ‘great Somali land grab’ had three manifes-
tations: the massive dispossession of farmland 
in the south (Besteman and Cassanelli 2000), 
the seizure of urban land in Hargaisa, Mogadi-
shu and Kismaayo (Kapteijns 2013), and the 
enclosure of the range. This section focuses 
only on the third, because it is the most relevant to the thesis of this paper that transformations 
in pastoralism contributed to transformations 
in identity politics. Historically, we can see that 
the pastoral land grab was also important in the 
organization of violence in the formative stages 
of the civil war. It is also the least document-
ed. The pastoral land grab took quite different 
forms in different parts of the country (Afri-
can Rights 1994): this paper will focus on the 
central rangelands and immediately adjoining 
areas (Hiraan, Galgadud and Middle Shebelle 
regions) as this was pivotal to the emergence 
of the USC as a clan militia, and not deal with 
the Jubba Valley or the north-west.
As the war began, vast areas of the central 
rangelands were being enclosed, with thorn 
fences thrown up. Enclosure strikes at the very 
heart of nomadic pastoralism. It forbids free 
movement of herds and prevents open access 
to grass and where it is widespread it spells an 
end to traditional nomadism. 
The Land Registration Act of 1975 made all 
collective land the property of the state, and 
gave government courts rather than lineage 
elders or Shari’a courts the authority to adju-
dicate land and inheritance claims. This was 
transformative for the farmlands of southern 
Somalia, leaving the minority groups that had 
customary rights to the land at the mercy of the 
state and its officials (Cassanelli 2015). It also 
had far-reaching impacts on rangeland man-
agement and pastoral land rights. Colonial ad-
ministrations imposed regulations on land use, 
including restricting grazing rights to certain 
areas to certain clans and demarcating pasto-
ral, agricultural and forest areas. The manage-
ment and enforcement of these regulations 
were mostly entrusted to lineage elders. The 
1975 act abolished the elders’ role. The restric-
tions had helped to ensure the range remained 
open; the relaxations always benefited the ex-
pansion of cultivation and enclosure. Selective 
attempts to re-impose land use classifications 
during the 1980s were not successful, as it 
proved impossible to enforce grazing reserves. 
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There were also sporadic government attempts 
to regulate pastoral and agro-pastoral enclo-
sure, which met with mixed success. Often, 
fences were burned on the orders of an admin-
istrative officer, only to be rebuilt within a few 
years. All land-use regulation collapsed during 
the war, and none was re-imposed. Hence, the 
regulations that (intermittently and unevenly) 
held the growth of enclosure in check were re-moved, and the pressure towards private own-
ership of pasture gathered momentum, uncon-
strained by legislation.
Enclosure occurred for a number of reasons. 
The reasons listed below are not mutually ex-
clusive and often, a particular piece of land was 
enclosed for several reasons simultaneously.
Agro-pastoral enclosures. The economic need 
to cultivate was probably the most common 
reason for enclosure. There were several forms 
of agro-pastoral enclosure. One can be called 
a ‘rotational pastoral enclosure.’ Under this 
system, an area of land—say, four hectares—
is enclosed, but only one hectare cultivated in 
any one year. The farmer assumes that three 
years are required for the land to recover from 
each year’s cultivation. The farmed area rotates 
through the whole enclosed area, in a self-sus-
taining cycle (Behnke 1988). The second is 
‘shifting enclosure.’ Under this, an area is en-
closed and part of it cultivated, but there is no 
intention to manage the enclosed area on a sus-
tainable basis. After a while, the enclosure will 
be abandoned as the farmer encloses another 
area, or revert to a pure (albeit degraded) pas-
toral enclosure. The third is ‘fictional agro-pas-
toral enclosure.’ According to law and custom, 
only cultivated land should be enclosed. Hence, 
a pastoralist wishing to enclose rangeland may 
create a small area of cultivation within a large 
enclosure purely in order to give an appear-
ance of complying with the law.
Pastoral grazing reserves. Ownership of 
grazing reserves or ranches was a character-
istic of the wealthy. Enclosure of the range is 
strictly illegal, but under Siyaad Barre, wealthy 
or well-connected individuals were able to cir-
cumvent the law. Some were awarded land for 
agricultural projects which never materialized, 
enabling them to use the land for private gain. 
In areas where commercial sheep production 
was advanced, large enclosures were common. 
This was the case for example in Nooleye in 
the central rangelands (Somali Democratic Re-
public and Mascott Ltd., 1985, Annexe I Section 
3.2). Close to towns, many pastoralists began 
to enclose pastures to support cattle, so that 
they could provide milk supplies to the urban 
markets. Many of the bigger commercial enclo-
sures were dismantled and overrun during the 
war, but as soon as commercial livestock pro-
duction rebounded in the early 1990s, enclo-
sure resumed where it was possible.
Commercial grass production. Enclosure of 
the range can also be an economic proposition 
for non-herders. Sale of the grass—either by 
renting out the grazing for a fee or by cutting 
the grass for sale in the marketplace—can be 
an important source of income. For the most 
part, traders themselves deny that they have 
enclosed land for their own use, instead they 
prefer to buy fodder on the market. Many of 
those who have enclosed have been poor peo-
ple or speculators with low incomes, who see 
the sale of grass as a potential source of income. 
Land banking. Once enclosure has started in a 
particular area, it develops a momentum of its 
own. Those who have no immediate reason for 
enclosure may try to enclose land, fearing that 
if they do not do it now, the opportunity will 
be lost. There is an element of panic and spec-
ulation in every land-grab. This was well-ex-
pressed by Roy Behnke:
‘The problem, [Nooleye residents] main-
tained, was that everyone has panicked, 
anticipating a land shortage, and enclosed 
huge fallow areas for future use. But like a 
run on a bank, the panic was self-fulfilling... 
No-one planned to enclose the area, resi-
dents say it just happened, the unintended 
result of each individual protecting his own 
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interests (Behnke 1988, p. 6).” 
A land-grab for pasture can be sparked by any 
form of enclosure. For example, in any area 
where there is a threat of agro-pastoral enclo-
sure, herders are prone to fence land pre-emp-
tively. 
Politically-motivated land enclosure. Once 
a land grab was underway, in the context of a 
violently contested political struggle, it inevi-
tably became a political, and sometimes mili-
tary, matter. As we turn to the process of armed 
group formation, below, the intrusion of poli-
tics and counter-insurgency into land seizure 
will be clear.
The outcome of the land grab in pastoral areas was a massive growth in the private ownership 
of pastureland and the appropriation of land 
and water for the exclusive use of particular 
clans. In turn this led to a reconfiguration of 
territoriality and identity, a shift away from a 
society governed by the lineage principle to-wards one governed by a more standard mod-
el of territorially-constituted political units. 
Another outcome was a proliferation of land 
disputes. Several of these contributed direct-
ly to the mobilization of the insurgencies that 
6  Note that in the Somali lineage, the Salebaan are usually classified as a subclan of the Habr Gidir.
overthrew Siyaad. Three conflicts in the central 
rangelands that fed into the USC rebellion, are 
examined next.
Conflicts in the Central 
Rangelands
Conflict among pastoralists in the central 
rangelands had reached a high intensity be-
fore any politically-organized insurgency be-
gan. The story of these conflicts has rarely been 
told, and still more rarely have their origins 
and dynamics been analyzed. 
The USC’s Omer Elmi writes, ‘Mudug was the 
cradle of USC struggle well ahead of USC’s for-
mation.’ (Elmi 1993, p. 29) He describes the 
first ‘guerrilla units’ forming in 1988 at Balli 
Dhuumoodle near Galkayo, consisting of fight-
ers from two Hawiye clans, Salebaan and Habr Gidir,6 who first clashed with the ‘regime’ (spe-
cifically, Clan groups aligned with the presi-
dent) and then joined first the SSDF and then 
the SNM before forming the nucleus of the USC. 
They had two ‘bases’: Dhuumoodle and Hanah 
Weilod. Elmi writes that by the end of 1990, 
‘the Dhumoodle Base had finally proliferated 
into a prairie fire of guerrilla activities up to the 
gates of Mogadishu’ (p. 29).
The story can also be told as a series 
of conflicts over pasture and water, 
in which the senior figures in the government intervened in a partisan 
manner, intensifying the violence. It 
is not easy to resolve the question of whether those disputes originat-
ed in the pasturelands or among the 
political elites circulating in and out 
of the president’s political favour, but 
my focus in this section is on the local 
drivers of conflict. One such dispute 
was between Marehan and Salebaan 
(Hawiye) herders in Mudug. The or-
igins of this conflict lie in a history 
of migration and displacement in 
Galgadud. The contested area, north-
west of the main north-south ‘Chi-
Map 2. Central Rangelands
Source: Reliefweb
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nese’ road, is an important grazing area with 
good year-round water widely available. The 
proximity to the road also makes the area valu-
able for commercial herds as they can be easily 
trucked to Berbera or Bosaso.
In the 1960s, the Salebaan corporate lineage 
group was expanding into previously Marehan 
areas. Under Siyaad Barre, this process was re-
versed. In 1983, on the creation of the CRDP, the government made a big dry season grazing re-
serve in an area previously grazed by the Sale-
baan, but Marehan herders were given prefer-
ential access. The following year, the CRDP put 
in a water point at in the same locality, and the 
local authorities awarded the water rights sole-
ly to the Marehan. This led, inevitably, to armed 
conflict between the Marehan and Salebaan, 
with the government supporting the Marehan.
The 1987 drought led to disruption through-
out the central rangelands, with several con-
flicts erupting over grazing and water. For ex-
ample Habr Gidir-Ayr (Hawiye) herders fought 
against Murursade (Hawiye) pastoralists near 
El Bur, but the government was neutral in this 
conflict and helped settle it. However, the gov-
ernment intervened decisively against the Sale-
baan. Troops machine-gunned herds of camels 
trying to cross the Chinese road into Mare-
han-controlled areas, and despatched soldiers 
to defend Marehan water points against use by 
other clans.
A second case is a dispute between the Omer 
Mohamoud (Majerteen/Darood) and the Habr 
Gidir-Sa’ad (Hawiye). This conflict appears to 
have been almost entirely politically-instigat-
ed: it is the one referred to Elmi above. The 
north-western part Mudug region is dry and 
the enclosure or private ownership of land 
here would be almost entirely futile, and there 
is the additional problem of shortage of trees 
and bushes with which to make fences. For 
both clans, cooperation in providing access 
to grazing has a stronger economic rationale 
than an attempt to exclude the other from cer-
tain areas. Historically, clashes have occurred 
mostly at water points, especially when wa-
ter is scarce. During the early 1980s, in fact, 
the Sa’ad were largely free from the pressures 
on land that existed further to the south. The 
major reason for this was that between 1978 
and 1985, the government was engaged in con-
flict against the Majerteen on account of the 
attempted coup of 1978 and the subsequent 
formation of the SSDF. The southernmost Ma-
jerteen lineage, the Omer Mohamoud, were 
among the chief targets.
In this region, Mudug, territorial disputes be-
tween the Omer Mohamoud and the Sa’ad 
had existed since the 19th century. The Ital-
ians designated a line between the two clans, 
known as the Tomaselli Line, but this was for-
mally abolished in 1971 with the abolition of 
clan territories. Moreover, in the 1960s, Ma-
jerteen-dominated governments had been en-
couraging Omer Mohamoud herders to push 
southwards. However, the tide dramatically re-
versed after 1978 with Siyaad Barre’s repres-
sion of the Majerteen. Although not designed to 
have this effect, it allowed the Sa’ad to expand 
northwards. In 1985, with the government’s 
adoption of ‘Daroodism’, Siyaad Barre made a 
rapprochement with the Majerteen. The Omer 
Mohamoud was the clan that benefitted least from this in terms of government positions, but 
it now had government and if necessary mili-
tary support in regaining its lost territories, 
and violent conflict over the grazing land esca-
lated. This contributed directly to the mobiliza-
tion of the Habr Gidir-Saad as a proto-militia, 
which was then the raw material for the USC’s 
Dhuumoodle ‘garrison’.
A third example, illustrates another wrinkle in 
this story. It is the conflicts arising from wide-
spread enclosure in the south-east of Galgadud 
region in the 1980s. It shows the complex and 
inter-connected roles of different reasons for 
enclosure, including the political motive for 
controlling territory by rival clans—in this 
case both of them Hawiye. The dispute was 
between the Abgaal and Murursade corporate 
lineage groups. The political component of the 
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dispute was a rivalry over political control of 
the district councils. The Abgaal (specifically 
the Waisle lineage) controlled El Dheere dis-
trict and were dominant in Nooleye district. 
The Murursade were dominant in El Bur dis-
trict (shared with Habr Gidir Ayr and Duduble) 
and a substantial minority in Nooleye, but felt 
that their numbers and importance warranted 
control of another council. Under the leader-
ship of Mohamed Sheikh Osman (then minister 
of finance), Murursade businessmen invested 
in several villages, including Birgaan, Jacar and 
Gal Harerey and finally succeeded in having the 
latter upgraded to a district council, which was 
duly controlled by Murursade.
Control of land was both means and aim of the 
struggle. The Abgaal hoped to expand their ter-
ritory to cope with their increasing numbers of 
animals; the Murursade tried to block them off. 
Each lineage group rushed to enclose land, es-
pecially prime land close to water points. This 
had a clear economic rationale—it was this 
very land that was ideal for commercial sheep 
production and was desired by both groups. 
Under economic pressure, many herders were 
also taking up cultivation. But it also had a po-
litical (and psychological) rationale—by en-
closing land, it was denied to the other. Once 
the rush for land had started, members of each 
lineage group enclosed what they could while 
land was still readily available. The rush to-
wards land was further intensified by the 1987 
drought, which caused serious livestock losses 
(up to 80 percent in the Middle Shebelle).
Control of water was another means in the ri-
valry. Murursade politicians were able to direct 
international assistance supplied through the 
CRDP preferentially into their area. For exam-
ple in 1987, the CRDP engineering team re-
sponsible for excavating water reservoirs was 
directed to work in Murursade areas as a pri-
ority, despite their relatively good water sup-
plies, overturning its professionally-assessed 
priority of providing help to the largely wa-
terless areas customarily grazed by Duduble-
owned herds. Meanwhile, prominent Abgaal 
merchants and elders, such as the Ali Shador 
family, also invested in private water points to 
try to expand their area of control.
Violent conflict is reported to have started at 
Nooleye with Murursade herders demanding 
access to the Abgaal-controlled (but legally 
open to all) borehole. During a local drought in 
1984, Murursade herders moved southwards 
and tried to graze Abgaal enclosures by force. The government intervened in support of the 
Murursade and burned many fences, but the 
enclosures were rapidly re-established.
This conflict illuminates how two other pro-
to-militias arose, linked to patrons with polit-
ical and business interests distributed across 
different levels of local and national govern-




To understand the emergence of the Clan-based 
military-political order, we need also to analyse 
the political-military context in which it arose. 
Two strands are particularly crucial. The first, 
discussed here, is the security strategies adopt-
ed by Siyaad Barre. The second, in the next sec-
tion, is the organization of the insurgency.
Siyaad Barre did not create clan politics from 
scratch or alone, but his attempts to coup proof 
his regime in Mogadishu and suppress insur-
gencies in the north were crucial to the way 
in which lineage identities became politically 
salient. At a tactical level, Siyaad Barre used 
lineage as a mechanism for neutralizing the 
organizational capability of military units and 
state institutions that he saw as threats. To un-
dermine and circumvent them he animated al-
ternative patronage networks utilizing patron-
age. Unlike the colonial powers that had floated 
above the lineage system and used clan as an 
instrument for indirect rule, Siyaad Barre was 
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embedded within the lineage system, and used 
it directly for divide and rule.
From the first days of his regime, Siyaad’s big-
gest immediate threat had been his closest mil-
itary colleagues. Two of his most prominent 
co-conspirators in the coup were dismissed in 
1970 and 1971, one of them executed. Siyaad 
then consolidated his regime and hugely ex-
panded the army and its officers’ privileges. In 
the mid-1970s, the USSR provided 250 tanks 
and 52 combat aircraft, meaning that it out-
numbered and outclassed Ethiopia (Lefebvre 
1992, pp. 159-60; Robinson 2016, p. 240). The 
army was the symbol of national unity, with 
officers and men from all Somali speaking ter-
ritories. They were well-paid, well-trained and 
had high social standing. After the debacle of 
the 1977-78 war and the ignominious retreat 
from the Ethiopian Ogaden, the officer corps 
was the number one threat to Siyaad Barre’s 
power. And indeed within a few months there was an attempt-
ed putsch. Be-
cause of the lin-
eage of several 
of its leaders it was branded as 
a Majerteen con-
spiracy: its Clan identity was forged more in its repression than 
its inception. But the spirit of nationalism—
now defensive and fearful—still animated the 
army, with fears that Ethiopia was going to 
launch a large-scale counter-invasion. There 
were indeed two cross-border incursions in 
1981 and 1982, although it became clear that neither superpower was going to risk another 
confrontation on the scale of 1977. 
After defeat in 1978, all Somalis agreed that Si-
yaad Barre’s days were numbered. In turn, the 
president’s dominant calculus was neutraliz-
ing the always-imminent threat of a coup. This 
led him to dismantle any institution that could 
threaten him, starting with the army. Purges of 
senior officers began even while Ethiopia still 
presented a serious military threat, with its 
forces crossing the border in 1981 and 1982. 
But Siyaad Barre was more fearful of a coup 
than an invasion. Within a decade, Somalia’s 
once-proud national army had been reduced to 
a coalition of Clan militias. This was a familiar 
strategy of disorder as a political instrument 
(Chabal and Daloz 1999), with the predictable 
consequence that, while reducing the threat of 
a coup, it increased the likelihood of insurgency 
(c.f. Roessler 2016). It was also a familiar pro-
cess whereby an armed conflict, as it persists, 
consolidates ethno-territorial identity units.
The process of dismantling the army began 
apace in 1982. The former head of intelligence 
Jama Ghalib (1995) details the arrests of seven 
high-ranking officials on 9 June 1982. One was 
Ismail Ali Aboker, third vice president and a key 
engineer of the 1969 coup. Others included the 
former foreign minister Omer Arteh, extreme-
ly well-connected to Somalia’s Arab sponsors. 






han was also 
on the list 
but couldn’t 
be found that evening). The most significant of 
these was General Omer Haji Mohamed, who 
had earlier been groomed as a potential head 
of the army but had drawn up plans for reform 
ran afoul of the patronage networks of Siyaad’s 
senior wife Khadija (pp. 168-70).
This was to be Siyaad’s logic: power first, lin-
eage or Clan identity as a secondary factor, 
manipulated for the purposes of power. Ghalib 
observes how he both favoured the Marehan 
and hit them hardest when they were disloyal 
to him (pp. 174-5).
A few years later, the opposition dubbed Si-
yaad’s security apparatus ‘MOD’: Marehan, 
Ogadeen, Dulbhante. It was a characteristic So-
mali play on words, describing the Ministry of 
Unlike the colonial powers that had floated above 
the lineage system and used clan as an instrument 
for indirect rule, Siyaad Barre was embedded 
within the lineage system, and used it directly for 
divide and rule.
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Defence as a cabal of lineages. It was true in-
sofar as individuals from those clans occupied 
high positions in the army and intelligence, but 
it misrepresented the system of rule, which was 
not rule of clans but rule of Somalia by using 
individuals chosen to represent clans. Through-
out the 1980s, Siyaad played clan politics by 
making sure that some representatives of each 
clan or subclan had a position in the govern-ment and army, making them into brokers of 
patronage, coopting them into his kleptocracy, 
and playing them off against one another.
One of the standard mechanisms for 
coup-proofing is divide-and-rule, especially 
keeping commanders busy in their home areas 
and tying them up with local rivals. Siyaad was 
a master of this. Compagnon notes, ‘One of his 
tactics was to militarize the clans by creating 
clan militias, giving them weapons, and then 
implicating them in the repression against a 
targeted clan segment.’ (1998, p. 176) These 
militias were typically commanded by SNA of-
ficers, serving or retired. The problem is that 
these militias are typically less effective than 
a professional military. First, they are poorly 
trained and less disciplined. Second, they per-
petrate indiscriminate violence against com-
munities, partly because they do not have the 
accurate intelligence to identify individuals and 
so inflict atrocities on entire communities, and 
partly because they have material incentives 
to rob and loot. Because militia commanders 
have some command autonomy, they can also 
more readily rebel, though any such rebellions 
are less dangerous than the mutiny of a regular 
army unit.
The 1980s witnessed mutiny after mutiny. Not 
all the mutineers joined the opposition. Many 
negotiated with the government and some ac-
cepted to return to the regime, usually gaining 
a post that allowed them to profit from cor-
ruptly-awarded contracts or to run a private 
militia as a lucrative counter-insurgent and 
looting operation.
The government also mounted a counterin-
surgency of remarkable brutality, destroying 
entire cities in the north, looting and disposing 
whole communities, displacing hundreds of 
thousands, and killing tens of thousands (Af-
rica Watch 1990). It was the intensification of 
this insurgency, which Siyaad Barre identified 
as an ‘Isaaq’ Clan rebellion, and his evocation 
of ‘Daroodism’ as a counterweight, that made 




The final and most essential element of the 
story of the creation of ‘clans’ is the rivalrous 
politics within the armed opposition. The ac-
count begins with the first coup attempt in 
1978, and becomes particularly significant in 
the mid-1980s with the deeply compromised 
attempt to build a unified national opposition 
front. The failure of that attempt was marked 
the fracturing of the SNM, which in turn was 
crucial for the emergence of the USC as the 
putatively dominant political-military force in 
the Hawiye areas of the central rangelands and 
Mogadishu. The dynamics of the birth of the 
USC have discoloured Somali politics—notably 
identity politics—ever since.
The opposition to Siyaad Barre began by trying 
to claim nationalist credentials. After the disas-
trous war with Ethiopia, Siyaad Barre could not 
be accused of being unpatriotic, only of being 
an incompetent dictator. The opposition fronts 
were established with the enormous handicap 
that their bases were in Ethiopia, the historic 
enemy. The names they chose speak of their at-
tempts to claim nationalist legitimacy. Despite 
the way in which they became identified with 
‘clans’, each front has a name that combines 
‘Somali’, with ‘salvation’, ‘national’, ‘patriotic’ 
and ‘united’. 
The opposition was handicapped in practical 
ways by its foreign sponsors. The Ethiopians 
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did not want inadvertently to incubate a new 
nationalist government in Somalia, and repeat-
edly interfered in the leadership of the SSDF 
and SNM, sometimes brutally. Another spon-
sor was Libya, but Colonel Muammar Gaddafi 
was mercurial and unreliable. The communist 
government in South Yemen provided crucial 
early support to the SNM, but did not follow 
up. However, much more problematic was the 
internal disorganization of the opposition and 
its violent factionalization. The SSDF was bro-
ken by internal disputes. Among other things, 
this had the disastrous legacy that Somali in-
tellectuals were deterred from joining the op-
position, leaving the leadership to soldiers and 
businessmen. The opposition political analy-
sis was limited to the goal of removing Siyaad 
Barre and his clique from power (Samatar 
1992, p. 625; Elmi 1993, p. 18).
The underlying structural weakness of the op-
position was that each group was set up with 
the intent of mounting a military putsch—and 
they expected that opportunity to come soon. 
The priority was not winning a people’s war by 
following the classic stages of guerrilla insur-
gency but rather to possess sufficient military 
strength to either strike the death blow or to be 
on hand to take over as the regime crumbled. 
Therefore the driving logic of the rebel leaders 
was positioning themselves vis-à-vis their in-
ternal rivals to be in the best position to take 
power at that critical moment. It followed that 
until internal rivalries were resolved, the war 
should continue. They thus replicated the key 
feature of the Siyaad Barre regime, which was 
keeping institutional capacities weak for fear 
of a takeover. For the rebels, this was a fatal im-
pediment to building a mature political move-
ment and an institutional and disciplined army. 
Leaders were fearful that newcomers might ar-
rive with financial resources or newly-defected 
military units that would be strong enough to 
take over the leadership. 
The Somali National 
Movement
The SNM began through a hybrid of different 
elements. One was a local militia, initially a unit 
of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), 
which had been the guerrilla force fighting 
hand-in-hand with the Somali National Army 
inside Ethiopia. The WSLF set up rear bases 
in north-west Somalia after being pushed out 
of Ethiopia in 1978. Its fighters gained a bad 
reputation for abusing local people, and Isaaq 
elders petitioned the government to create an 
Isaaq wing of the WSLF. Known as Afraad (the 
‘fourth unit’), this became operational 1979 and 
quickly came into armed conflict, first with the 
WSLF and then with government forces. Forc-
ibly transferred away from the border, many 
Afraad militiamen defected and became guer-
rillas. In parallel there was a series of clash-es between Isaaq and Ogadeni herders in the 
Haud pastures of the north-west and adjoining 
areas of Ethiopia. The first armed actions by 
the SNM took place inside Ethiopian territory, 
as the SNM drove the WSLF out of Ethiopia.
Another element was military officers from the 
north-west who defected and began organizing 
a rebel army in 1981-82. The name they chose 
is instructive: it is a deliberate echo of the So-
mali National Army, from whose ranks the SNM 
officers were drawn, and it espoused a national 
agenda, and—despite the fact that Somalis all 
speak the same Somali language—it chose to 
give itself an English name and set of initials, so 
as to attract international support. Most of the 
SNM officers were in fact from the Isaaq clan 
family, and most of its financial support was 
from Isaaq clan family businessmen abroad. 
Nonetheless they recruited non-Isaaq and at 
times the SNM had substantial components 
from other clans. A third component was busi-
nessmen, with those in the diaspora in Britain 
taking the lead as they were freer to act than 
those within Somalia. Their preference was 
generally to form an Isaaq clan movement.
The political trajectory of the SNM in the 1980s 
created the template for the disordered clan-
nism that followed. It managed the personal 
rivalries among its leaders better than oth-
er movements, but at the expense of never 
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clarifying its political objectives. Particularly 
problematic was the divide between the dias-
pora leadership and the military commanders (known as calan cas), with deep rivalries with-
in each grouping. Although the final outcome 
was the separation of Somaliland, the seces-
sionists in the movement could not show their 
hand because they relied on Ethiopia which 
was vehemently anti-separatist. The unionists 
initially won the tactical arguments, so that 
military operations were expanded from the 
north-west (the homeland of the Isaaq, from 
where the founders were drawn) to the centre 
and south, and a Hawiye deputy president was 
chosen (Ali Wardigley, who became a founder 
of the USC).
The SNM massively under-utilized its material 
and human resources. Jama Ghalib, a former 
senior intelligence officer who helped organize 
clandestine support for the SNM and was pro-
foundly frustrated to see how the capable and 
well-placed individuals he helped recruit were 
not utilized, explains it in these words: ‘The 
rules of the game played by the opportunists 
[in the SNM] were that the SNM should never 
succeed in overthrowing Siad Barre or in forc-
ing his troops out of the North until certain of-
ficers could seize the leadership of the move-
ment.’ (1995, p. 186)
The course of the war and the identity of the 
SNM dramatically changed in 1988. Faced with 
growing insurgency and continual political 
crisis, Siyaad Barre gambled that a peace deal 
with the Ethiopian government (facing similar 
crises) would free him from the SNM rebels. He 
miscalculated. In response to the imminent ex-
pulsion of the SNM from its rear bases in Ethio-
pia, the SNM leadership decided to go on the of-
fensive, against huge odds, and attack the cities 
of Hargaisa and Burao. The results of the attack 
included: the devastation of the SNM fighting 
forces, with as many as half of its officers and 
men killed or out of action; the devastation of 
the two cities and the flight of most of the pop-
ulation to the refugee camp of Hartisheikh in 
Ethiopia; and the escalation of the government 
counter-insurgency (Africa Watch 1990). 
The government counter-insurgency was 
aimed at the Isaaq Clan explicitly and indis-
criminately. Siyaad Barre and his son-in-law 
General Mohamed Hersi ‘Morgan’ did not trust 
the SNA and so did not rely on its units. They 
hired foreign mercenaries to fly their planes, 
and they mobilized refugees from the Ogaden 
clan and from Oromo refugee camps as count-
er-insurgent militia. The fighters were paid in 
loot: when they had finished, Hargaisa was a 
roofless city, with all the zinc stolen for sale, 
as well as any remaining vehicles, contents of 
shops, furniture, copper wire, even window 
frames. 
The regime, as by far the more powerful actor, 
must take the greater share of responsibility 
for turning a political conflict into an ethnic 
war. But the SNM was not innocent of ethnici-
zation either. It had a historic opportunity in 
1988: in renouncing the Somali claim to the 
Ogaden, Siyaad Barre forfeited his strongest 
nationalist card. Many army officers were driv-
en to mutiny: commanders from the Ogadeen 
in the SNA and from diverse lineages aligned 
with the SSDF contacted the SNM to bring their 
forces over. The SNM spurned them, passing up 
its political chance. 
Two SNA commanders, Colonel Omer Jees and 
Colonel Bashir Bililiqo, offered to mutiny with 
their fully-formed military units and establish 
a common front. When the SNM did not take 
them up, they joined armed herdsmen of the 
Ogadeen in the Jubba Valley to form the Soma-
li Patriotic Movement (SPM). The pastoralists 
were in a stage of near insurrection because of 
disputes with the Marehaan over control of the 
Afmadow pastures (Janssen 1988) and rival-
ries over the export of cattle (Little 1992).
The SNM withdrew its units from central and 
southern Somalia and proposed to its non-
Isaaq members that they set up friendly politi-
cal-military fronts in their home areas. In 1989, 
General Mohamed Farah Aideed, from the Habr 
The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 22
Gidir-Ayr (Hawiye), approached the SNM lead-
ership wanting to join the organization and 
broaden its base. The SNM leadership advised 
him to start his own resistance front in the cen-
tral rangelands, the Hawiye home territory and 
handed over one base (Mustahil) to him.
Instead, the SNM became an Isaaq Clan move-
ment. The shattered rebel army regrouped in 
Hartisheikh camp, while the relatives of the dis-
possessed and disappeared mobilized in out-
rage and solidarity. The camp itself was laid out 
on the basis of lineage groups. This was partly 
spontaneous and partly for ease of adminis-
tration of relief rations by the UN. There was 
a flood of angry and dispossessed young men 
wanting to join; their leaders agitated them on 
behalf of the Isaaq, which had been subject to 
a genocidal attack. The SNM veteran soldiers 
were vastly outnumbered by these recruits. For 
ease of organization the SNM was re-mobilized 
as lineage-based fighting units. Clan elders fa-
cilitated the recruitment of volunteers. Ghal-
ib describes how ardent volunteers managed 
to ‘force their way into the movement, when 
their sub-clans brought pressure to bear on 
the SNM military commanders, a pattern which 
was eventually to have a negative effect … It 
strengthened loyalty to the parochial sub-clans 
at the expense of central authority.’ (1995, p. 
192) Family networks provided the circuitry 
for sending supplies to the camp and the SNM 
and bringing the elderly and sick abroad for 
care and treatment. ‘Clan cleansing’ in Hargaisa 
and Burao was instrumental in creating a sense 
of politicized clan identity among the survivors. 
As the movement became an Isaaq Clan entity, it 
set its sights on the state power commensurate 
with its reach: a separate Somaliland republic.
In this situation of crisis, the institution of 
lineage ‘elders’ emerged as a workable mech-
anism for organizing solidarity. This might 
appear to vindicate the Lewisian thesis of the 
resilience of clan, and indeed a narrative of the 
selfless, respected clan elders forming a council 
to resolve the quarrels of the fractious fighters 
and politicians served the people of northwest 
Somalia well, through to the meeting of the 
Guurti (council of elders) in 1993 that forged a 
government for Somaliland (Bradbury 2008). 
It is no accident that the Isaaq leaders of that 
time appealed simultaneously to the legacy of 
British colonialism (which defined the territory 
of Somaliland), to the clearest exposition of late 
colonial administrative tribalism, namely Lew-
is’s Pastoral Democracy, and to a generation of 
men shaped by that colonial encounter. It is the 
most benign face of clannism, but it is an his-
torical invention nonetheless. The ‘elders’ had 
no special claim to leadership other than their 
personal reputations and social standing. Most 
were businessmen or out-of-work politicians, 
some were professionals and academics. All 
had brothers and cousins who were fighting 
men or active politicians. It was merely person-
al circumstance and moral choice that led some 
to become ‘elders’ dedicated to the community 
rather than political or military entrepreneurs, 
and indeed some switched from one category 
to the other, in either direction.
The ironic success of Siyaad Barre’s counter-in-
surgency and instrumentalization of disorder 
was that he destroyed the SNM as a fighting 
force and an organized political movement. 
He reduced it to a mirror image of the regime, 
paralyzed by infighting and without effective 
leadership. The SNM command could not even 
coordinate the means to keep control of their 
putative capital of Hargaisa in 1989: they cap-
tured it but those responsible for resupplying 
the troops did not keep their word, forcing the 
fighters to abandon the city (Ghalib 1995, p. 
186). 
Between 1988 and 1993, the SNM’s own deci-
sion-making structures were gradually merged 
with the clan structure of the north-west, dom-
inated by the Isaaq, and ultimately taken over 
As the movement became an Isaaq Clan 
entity, it set its sights on the state power 
commensurate with its reach: a separate 
Somaliland republic.
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by the Clan. The lineage institutions were suffi-
ciently robust to regulate political competition even as the armed movement disintegrated, 
and the SNM served mainly as a political forum 
that legitimized Clan formation and the take-
over of a ruined state, and then dissolved when 
that job was done.
The United Somali Congress
The trajectory of the SNM from putative nation-
al political resistance front to vehicle for Clan 
formation, was followed by the USC, albeit in 
a different configuration, and with a different 
outcome. The USC emerged from the three el-
ements of businessmen and civic leaders seek-
ing a modicum of an orderly transition, ambi-
tious military officers intent on seizing power, 
and the existence of a large number of armed 
young men, already mobilized.
The Manifesto Group of 114 business and civic 
leaders, who came together in 1990, was Soma-
lia’s most tragic missed opportunity (Sahnoun 
1994). Even while Somalia descended into 
a militarized kleptocracy, its business class 
thrived (Jamal 1988). This did not translate 
into a well-organized bourgeois opposition. 
We can speculate several reasons for this fail-
ure. One is Siyaad Barre’s secularism, so that 
he did not permit an Islamist opposition (not-
ing that the Muslim Brothers at that time had 
their power base in business and civil society). 
A second is the lack of external support for any 
such initiatives. When the Manifesto Group 
issued its warning of the perils of the current 
situation, it was the best chance for a negoti-
ated transition of some kind. Siyaad Barre ar-
rested most of the signatories or forced them 
to flee: the list of those victimized is a verita-
ble catalogue of the most eminent Somalis of 
the independence generation (Ingiriis 2012). 
The most energetic and persuasive member 
of the Manifesto Group, Ismail Jimale, died of 
a heart attack in Rome just two months later. 
Moreover, the group was supported by just one 
foreign embassy (Italy). A donor consortium 
demanding change might have been effective, 
both in pressuring Siyaad Barre and in gener-
ating confidence in the opposition, so that (to 
use the language of the political marketplace) 
they could have begun trading in futures—is-suing promissory note to be redeemed for a 
specified price at such time that a recognized 
government were set up. Such donor support 
might have been a possibility just a year or two 
later, when western policies had shifted into 
their post-Cold War democratization mode. A 
third reason is the efficacy of violent suppres-
sion, exemplified by the trauma of the 14 July 
1989 massacre, which followed the murder of 
the bishop of Mogadishu in circumstances that 
were never explained. This immediate outcome 
was a rapid disintegration of security in the 
city and a rush by residents to arm themselves. 
There was, at the time, no evident logic of ei-
ther Clan or political mobilization, but rather a 
sense of bewilderment, fear and isolation (Si-
mons 1995, pp. 67-98). 
The Manifesto Group was the co-originator of 
the USC. But the military wing of the USC, led 
by Gen. Aideed, quickly became dominant. Al-
though the split between the two wings was 
evident from the outset, neither could abandon 
the name USC, because—following the exam-
ple of the SNM—it was coterminous with the 
Hawiye Clan and its claimed homeland. As that 
territory included the capital city, the fate of 
Somalia turned on the resolution of the ques-
tion of who should lead the USC.
The earlier section on the land disputes in the 
central rangelands provided detail on how var-
ious lineage units of the Hawiye formed armed 
militia. Those processes of militarization fol-
lowed different paths and the armed units that 
emerged were organized at different levels of 
lineage segmentation. The key facts are that 
none were fighting as the ‘Hawiye clan’ but 
nonetheless what Elmi calls the ‘prairie fire’ of 
the central rangelands (1993, p. 29) was already 
burning fiercely before the USC was formed. 
When Aideed crossed the border from Ethiopia 
he found militias awaiting a leader, and he was 
happy to oblige. This meant, of course, that his 
units were also organized on the lineage princi-
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ple rather than as a disciplined liberation force 
or even a unified Clan army. The USC never had 
a core of nationalist veteran soldiers compa-
rable to the SNM, nor even units drawn from 
across all the Hawiye lineage groups. Recall, 
moreover, that this was not a traditional kind 
of mobilization of camel-herding dia-paying groups bound together by xeer. Rather, this was 
a combination of young men whose prospects 
of traditional pastoral livelihoods were dim 
(popularly known as mooryan), businessmen 
who owned the herds and were deeply imbri-
cated in the enclosures, and lineage elders who 
were trying to manage these changes and trau-
mas, while pursuing their own interests too.
Mustahil was the former SNM base inside Ethi-
opia, handed over to the USC in 1989. Aideed 
convened a conference there in May-June 1990, 
at which delegates unanimously voted for him 
chairman of the USC. Elmi summarizes the 
participants and agenda. Delegates from the 
diaspora, from the SNM Southern Front, from 
the ‘bases’ at Dhumoodle, Hana-Weilood and 
Hiran—each of them in effect a self-mobilized 
pastoralist self-defence militia—and what 
were described as ‘Galgadud and Mogadishu 
guerrillas and activists’ were present. Elmi 
writes: ‘Action plans were drawn up to unify 
all these USC supporting factions and armed 
struggle streamlined from scattered groups 
and spontaneous sporadic actions into a uni-
fied comprehensive form with a centrally com-
manded force.’ (Elmi 1993, p. 30) There was no 
time for training or even organization, only a 
rush of existing units under their commanders 
into battle or in search of spoils.
Aideed then called for the SNM and SPM to join 
him for a conference to determine the future 
coalition government. The SNM refused to at-
tend—its more nationally-oriented members 
felt that they should be the convenors of the 
conference, and its more secessionist members 
wanted nothing to do with Mogadishu. They 
could agree only to coordinate military opera-
tions to remove Siyaad Barre, which amounted 
7  Speaking to this author, Nairobi, February 1992.
to no more than designating separate areas of 
operations. The failure of this initiative meant 
that as the collapse of the regime accelerated, 
the opposition had no plan for power other than dividing up the areas they intended to de-
spoil.
In December 1990, an uprising began in Mog-
adishu against Siyaad Barre. At that time, USC 
and SPM forces were more than a hundred 
miles from Mogadishu: USC to the north, SPM 
to the south. The main forces in the city were 
Siyaad Barre’s units drawn from the most loyal 
lineages: Marehan, Dulbahante and the Aforqe 
lineage of the Majerteen under command of Si-
yad Barre’s son-in-law, General Morgan. Mor-
gan’s troops were stationed at the national 
stadium and began stopping people on foot 
and in cars and buses, and selectively killing 
Abgaal and Habr Gidir. Dulbahante troops at 
fairground followed suit. 
Closest to the city was Omar Jees with his SPM 
forces. However, on Aideed’s insistence that 
Mogadishu was Hawiye territory, and that 
Hawiye troops would occupy the city with less 
resistance and less bloodshed, Jees held back 
and allowed the Aideed to send his fighters 
ahead. Immediately after the battle for Moga-
dishu, most Darood said that they believed that 
Aideed tricked Jees,7 but it is also possible that 
Aideed’s promise to bring Jess into government 
was genuine and was simply overtaken by 
events. In any case, the SPM lost its chance to 
take part in the ‘liberation’ of the capital, which 
also allowed the USC to seize control of the vast 
military arsenals there as well as loot the rich-
es of the city. The absence of Darood among the 
‘liberators’ helped make the final battle in Mog-
adishu into a clan war. Jees and his army waited 
just outside the city in Afgoy while the USC pol-
iticians squabbled and the USC fighters looted, 
pillaged, raped and killed. An exodus of Darood 
civilians streamed through Afgoy going south. 
Aideed’s lieutenants were also busy seizing the 
best farms along the Shebelle river. There is no 
agreed account of why Jees switched sides, but 
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the most credible story is that the final straw 
for him was when his erstwhile allies, the Ra-
hanweyn Somali Democratic Movement forces, 
turned against SPM troops in Baidoa on 7 Feb-
ruary. Three days later, Jees joined the emerg-
ing Darood resistance in Kismayo and the Jub-
ba valley. Clan cleansing in Mogadishu created 
the sentiments of a politicized common Clan 
identity among the Darood.
As the war reached its crescendo, the near-mor-
ibund SSDF was reinvented, as a solely Ma-
jerteen organization. After he was driven from 
Mogadishu in January, Siyaad Barre mobilized 
his Marehan clan as the Somali National Front 
(SNF), and tried to stage a comeback, his forc-
es reaching within thirty miles of Mogadishu 
in April 1991 before Aideed rallied the USC to 
drive them back.
The Dynamics of 
Fragmentation 1991-92
At the moment of victory over Siyaad Barre, the 
organization of the war in Somalia appeared 
very simple: the Isaaq had the SNM, the Hawiye 
had the USC, the Rahanweyn had the nascent 
SDM, and the Darood were divided between the 
Ogadeni SPM, the Majerteen SSDF and the rem-
nants in government. This was the first time in 
Somali history that political-military organi-
zation had reached the level of Clan (approx-
imately the four big clan families of the total 
genealogy). It was a product of that particular 
historic moment: a fight for the state follow-
ing acts of genocidal violence at the Clan level 
of aggregation (Kapteijns 2013). Somalia ap-
peared to fragment into subnational territories 
that followed Clan lines. Darood fled towards 
Kismayo and Kenya; a huge convoy of Isaaq left 
Mogadishu and headed north to Hargaisa. 
But even at that moment of apparent simplic-
ity, there were clear inconsistencies in the 
mapping of clan-family identities onto polit-
ical-military-territorial units. The SNM had a 
single clan-family organization, but it was fall-
ing apart. The USC also had one, but its two 
main factions were fighting one another, while 
some Hawiye subclans (Sheikhal, Hawadle) 
remained neutral. The Darood clan family had 
two, the SPM and SSDF, each of which had dis-
persed territories or potential territories, and 
shortly thereafter a third, the SNF. The minori-
ties didn’t have any.
The civil war made ‘clans’ as political-mili-
tary-territorial units, and ‘clans’ in turn made 
war to seize the state (or states, if we include 
Somaliland and Puntland). Even when the 
state had collapsed, the expectation of a state 
shaped the conflict. But once the USC had failed 
to control the national capital and thereby cap-
ture the state, a different logic of fragmentation 
became dominant. 
The first wars in Mogadishu, fought in 1991, 
had dual logic. On one hand, they were fought 
over the pillars of state power: Villa Somalia, 
the national radio, currency for the bank, and 
Map 3. Clan territories
Source: University of Texas.
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uniforms for the police. Ali Mahdi, by virtue of 
capturing Radio Mogadishu first and proclaim-
ing himself president, appointed the world’s 
biggest cabinet (over 70 members, from every 
clan), almost every one of whom was eyeing fu-
ture lucre; General Aideed (formally, Minister 
of Defence) did not turn up to the swearing-in 
ceremony, negotiations in Djibouti failed, and 
instead Aideed launched a coup in November 
1991. His military strike failed and there was a 
stalemate. 
On the other hand, there was looting: spoils 
politics taken to the extreme. As the Darood 
fled, their property was ransacked. This soon 
became organized commercially. The looters’ 
first targets were high value, low bulk electron-
ic goods: televisions, video players, fridges, air 
coolers, word processors, generators. Traders 
from Kenya, Sudan and the Gulf converged on 
Mogadishu with ships and light aircraft. Indus-
trial machinery, furniture. Then items with a 
resale value such as light fittings and window 
frames, plumbing fixtures, copper wiring and 
aluminium sheets.
Then, food became an object of looting. Relief 
food was particularly vulnerable to attack. Lo-
cal voluntary organizations tried to get around 
this problem by opening kitchens serving 
cooked food. The rationale for this unorthodox humanitarian operation was that ‘The dry food 
distribution is the one the gangs use [target]; 
they can sell it and do any other things, but 
when the food is cooked, it has not any value 
except to eat.8
The next round of politically-instigated fight-
ing was over the centres of commerce and rev-
enue, such as Mogadishu port and airport and 
Kismayo city. Those conflicts were also unre-
solved, and the fighting shifted to disputes over 
more local issues, such as smaller towns and 
the farmland along the Shebelle River. Briefly, 
the USC reunited to confront the threat of Siyad 
Barre’s attempted comeback from the Kenyan 
border, but as soon as the SNF forces were de-
8  Dhahabo Isse, interviewed in Mogadishu, 23 March 1993.
feated, the USC leaders fell out again. By the 
end of 1992, there were numerous local wars 
fought among ever more local armed groups.
The fighting of 1991-92 was hugely destructive, 
and created famine, with an epicentre in Bay 
and Lower Shebelle regions where local people 
were stripped of everything, even their cooking 
pots and clothes. The extent of depravity was 
shocking, and it both revealed and sharpened 
the racism towards the minorities who lived in 
the devastated areas (Besteman and Cassanelli 
2000). 
All militia looted humanitarian aid, an act with-
out immediate consequence because aid fell 
outside the moral orbit of the lineage system: 
no compensation could be demanded or need 
be paid. International aid agencies had nev-
er faced this kind of problem before, and they agonized over whether to hire armed guards, 
and improvised in their distribution systems. 
This experience led to a vigorous debate about 
the ethics and political economy of aid provid-
ers becoming players in a war economy, and—
more significant for this account—the role of 
aid in fuelling warlordism.
Among the most creative were the Internation-
al Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Save 
the Children Fund (SCF). They used dispersed 
routes for delivering aid so as to minimize the 
extent to which they were targeted by looters. 
The ICRC, which ran by far the biggest aid oper-
ation, offloaded from ships anchored offshore 
near Brava, Merca, Adala, Obbia and Gezira 
beach, onto small dhows which could sail up to 
the beaches. When the monsoon winds changed 
and offloading on small boats was not possible, 
the ICRC used helicopters. The ICRC delivered 
180,000 tons of food to Somalia in 1992. In 
Mogadishu, SCF ran numerous small feeding 
centres using local staff, and almost completely 
escaped looting. 
By contrast, the World Food Programme and 
its main implementing agency, CARE, stuck to 
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the standard practice of using the main port in 
Mogadishu, storing food in a large warehouse, 
and dispatching convoys of 25 or more lorries 
to large distribution centres. They became tar-
gets for both political appropriation, massive 
looting, and armed attack. The rate of distri-
bution was desperately slow, as CARE staff 
tried and failed to negotiate safe passage for 
their vehicles. When fierce fighting broke out 
in the city on 17 November 1991, nearly 8,000 
tons remained in the warehouse in the port. 
On 20 January 1992, while CARE prevaricat-
ed and the price of food in Mogadishu soared, 
the Hashamud militia that controlled the port 
announced it would open the food warehous-
es to all comers. Thousands of Mogadishu res-
idents flocked to the port and took what they 
could carry: residents reported seeing people 
totally white from the spilled flour that covered 
their bodies and clothes. The price of food in 
the city dropped to just one seventh of what it 
had been, and tension was markedly if briefly 
reduced. This was probably the best thing that 
could have happened to the WFP wheat, though 
it contributed to a somewhat misleading claim, 
made later that year, that 80 percent of food 
aid in Somalia was being looted, which was a 
justification for the U.S. military intervention. 
The experience of a lessening of tension due to 
a lower price of staple food led to a proposal 
to ‘flood the country with food’ by any means. 
Recognizing that any managed distribution of 
large amounts of dry food posed a security risk, 
the plan was to bring down the market price by 
any means, taking the pressure off the national 
food system. Ultimately, the strategy of provid-
ing as much food as possible by any means nec-
essary worked; the famine prices prevailing in 
July 1992 fell by two thirds by October.
More aid agencies arrived in Somalia in late 
1992 as the U.S. mounted an emergency airlift 
to the epicentre of the famine in Bay region, 
and still more after the U.S. military interven-
tion and the establishment of a huge and am-
bitious UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). 
NGOs responded to the continuing security 
problem by moving from directly providing 
emergency aid themselves to working through 
local NGOs, authorities and commercial con-
tractors, creating the new problem that their 
activities became associated with the identities 
of their Somali intermediaries (Gundel 2002). 
Aid’s main resources (food) and the even more 
substantial secondary resources provided by 
aid agencies (employment, housing and trans-
port contracts, protection payments) became a 
major, if transient, part of Somalia’s economy, 
and control of aid became an integral part of 
the political-commercial viability of politi-
cal-military units.
The fighting of 1991-92 also reconfigured po-
litical-military alignments. Aideed constructed 
the Somali National Alliance, bringing in ele-
ments from other armed groups (notably the 
SPM), while his rival Ali Mahdi constructed a 
parallel Somali Salvation Alliance that similar-
ly spanned different ‘clans’. The two coalitions 
had discernibly different economic interests: 
the USC-Aideed and SPM were ‘liberators’ whose interests were in seizing urban property 
and farmland, while the USC-Mahdi, SSDF and 
SNF leaders were more concerned with pro-
tecting the property rights they had acquired, 
by whatever means, over the previous decades. 
But those potential class interests were sub-
merged by the immediacies of mobilizing and 
funding military units. The USC existed only in-
sofar as it was the political vehicle legitimized 
for taking state power in Mogadishu, because 
it was identified with the Hawiye Clan, and for 
that reason neither of the rival leaders could 
abandon its name. In his brief stint as Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary General, 
the Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun cul-
tivated Hawiye elders as a counterweight to the 
warlords (Sahnoun 1994). Had he succeeded, 
the USC might have mutated into the Hawiye 
Clan as a less militarized political institution. 
Something comparable happened in Somalil-
and, where the SNM collapsed entirely and 
clan elders constituted a functional govern-
ment from the ashes. In south-central Somalia, 
that burn through was interrupted. Sahnoun 
was dismissed in October 1992 and the U.S. 
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mounted a military intervention six weeks lat-
er, which suddenly restored hope in a central 
state, a fountain of rents. 
Intervention and the 
Consolidation of Clan
The insurgencies of 1987-92 were organized 
on the basis of Clan for the purposes of captur-
ing state power, in Hargaisa or Mogadishu, or in 
the proto-state of Puntland. However, the polit-
ical-military fronts were formed from fractious 
and disorganized pastoralist militia, and what-
ever Clan unity existed was momentary, cir-
cumstantial, and unsustainable. The USC and 
its contenders were founded on massacre, ran-
sacking and ‘clan cleansing’. Subsequently, the 
memories of those traumas left Clan identity 
with an enduring salience, but only as vehicles 
for channelling resentment.
However, Clan also had a logic that was simple 
and attractive to outsiders, not least because 
the political-military organizations had given 
themselves English-language names and ini-
tials, which mapped on to a conveniently small 
number of units which could also be represent-
ed on a map of the country. This kind of terri-
toriality was new to Somali political ethnicity 
(Hoehne 2016). Clan units proved equally effi-
cacious as the interface with the international 
community in the absence of a state. Although 
the political-military entities existing in 1991 did not persist for more than a few brief years, 
they established an enduring framework for 
Somali political authority.
The U.S.-U.N. military intervention of 1992-93 
had several immediate consequences. One was 
to recentralize the political process: the imme-
diate prospect of state power was back. Ini-
tially, the Americans appeared to believe that 
their humanitarian objectives meant that they 
were not political actors, and that their nego-
tiations with the Mogadishu warlords would 
have no consequences other than enabling a 
safe environment for their troops and aid con-
voys. Soon, the U.S. indicated that they were in-
deed intending to create a government which 
could be recognized. The fast fragmenting po-
litical-military organizations scrambled to be-
come credible interlocutors with the interven-
ing forces and to get a seat at the table for the 
forthcoming talks. The Somalis, accustomed 
to strategic rents because of the geo-strategic 
position of their country during the Cold War, 
interpreted Operation Restore Hope as a re-af-
firmation of the importance of their country to 
America, and expected corresponding largesse.
Second, the Americans and the UN required a 
simple, legible model and map of the country, 
and an associated formula for peacemaking. 
The one they chose was to deal with the exist-
ing political-military organizations, as labelled, 
at the highest level of aggregation. UNOSOM 
adopted a policy of restricting political repre-
sentation on the envisaged National Council to 
factions existing at the time of the intervention. 
While UNOSOM understandably did not want 
to spark a violent competition for places by 
opening up options to new factions, this deci-
sion created another equally problematic po-
litical dynamic. It represented a contemporary 
version of the colonial practice of creating trib-
al territories and appointing administrative 
chiefs, and like that earlier version, involved 
freezing a dynamic socio-political reality in 
some places, trying to resurrect a disintegrat-ing arrangement in others, and inventing a for-
mula from scratch elsewhere. In many cases, 
direct cash payments were made to those cho-
sen as representatives; in others, participants 
expected vast resources to flow in the near fu-
ture.
In making this decision, UNOSOM was guided 
by the two places in which order was returning. 
In the north-west, the self-declared Republic of 
Somaliland, a convention organized by busi-
nessmen and clan elders instituted a new polit-
ical order, without any external input. Most of 
those involved were members of the Isaaq Clan, 
and the simplest explanation for success was the shared Isaaq identity and the robustness 
of traditional forms of conflict resolution and 
societal authority. The story is of course much 
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more complicated (Bradbury 2008; de Waal 
2015, pp. 130-140), but the narrative was reas-
suring to Somalis anxious to find laudable and 
state-building values and institutions in their 
own society. In the north-east, in the territory 
that became Puntland, order was also restored, 
within an area that roughly corresponded to 
the domain of the Majerteen. The SSDF did not 
disintegrate; it formed an administration and 
merged into it. The presumed model of inter-
nally homogenous Clan territories was adopt-
ed for the rest of the country, despite the far 
greater complexities in lineage and territorial 
organization and the absence of any compara-
bly cohesive political-military organizations.The main region for the intervention was 
south-central Somalia. Here, American mili-
tary officers, UNOSOM and aid agencies could 
not engage operationally at the Clan level, as 
no united and centralized USC-Hawiye organi-
zation existed, and their efforts focused on es-
tablishing local councils as intermediaries for 
providing security and protecting aid, with a 
view to being the legitimate authorities for re-
building a state. This process of identification 
was usually done very rapidly, with minimal 
consultation and little expertise. Some of those 
brought in for managing the process, such as 
the Life and Peace Institute, devoted enormous 
effort to trying to make the councils more rep-
resentative and effective (Heinrich 1997), but 
this was always a patch-up job: whatever lo-
cal hierarchy existed at the time of UNOSOM’s 
entry was kept intact, along with the security 
mechanisms offered by that local elite. Joakin 
Gundel observes that local people preferred 
UNOSOM to what came before or since, be-
cause it did impose a degree of stability, but 
concluded, ‘Yet the attempts by UNOSOM to 
buy political agreements through direct pay-
ments to local Somali leaders strengthened 
Somali perceptions of international assistance 
as a source of competition that undermined 
the peace process it was supposed to promote.’ 
(Gundel 2002, p. 154)
Beginning with the 1993 conferences, external 
mediators sought to balance a realistic recogni-
tion of the power of warlords, with attempts to 
ensure that all Somali groups were represent-
ed in peace talks and the governance structures 
set up. This reflects a laudable motive of ensur-
ing that politically marginalized groups have 
a seat at the peace table, and that discredited 
warlords do not dominate. However, the for-
mula for representation bears the deep imprint 
of the violent processes of Clan formation, and 
becomes a formula for sharing political offices, 
not solving political problems.
International peace-making efforts had an-
other common feature: they prioritized pow-
er-sharing agreements, leaving substantial 
political issues such as property ownership 
(farmland, urban real estate and pasture) and 
residence rights for resolution by a future gov-
ernment. This was never likely to work, as the 
outcome of the war represented the end point 
of more than a decade of spoils politics that cul-
minated in massive ethnic cleansing, ransack-
ing and forcible land-grabbing. The Clan armies 
existed precisely in order to pursue these tasks 
to their violent conclusion in the form of mass 
killing, clan-cleansing and expropriation. The 
zero-sum politics of allocating political office 
masked a still more important zero-sum spoils 
politics.
Over the subsequent fifteen years, all external 
peace-making, peace-building, state-building 
and constitution-writing efforts in Somalia had 
similar starting points: the assumption that a 
state in Somalia would arise through sharing 
power among representatives of the Clans, 
identified as such. This was adopted in the So-
dere Conference of November 1996-January 
1997, where a formula for political representa-
tion based on equal standing for the four major 
...the outcome of the war represented the 
end point of more than a decade of spoils 
politics that culminated in massive ethnic 
cleansing, ransacking and forcible land-
grabbing.
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Clans was first formally recognized. At the insti-
gation of the Somali participants, the Darood, 
Diir/Isaaq, Hawiye and Rahanweyn were each 
awarded nine seats on the National Salvation 
Council, with five seats reserved for minorities 
(Africa Confidential 1997, p. 2). Four years lat-
er this evolved into the ‘4.5’ formula that was 
explicitly named and adopted in the Arta Con-
ference of April-May 2000 and maintained at 
the 2002-04 Mbagathi National Reconciliation 
Conference in Kenya, and throughout the sub-
sequent constitution-building conferences. It is 
commonplace to hear the evils of clannism de-
cried by officials in international organizations 
and the leaders of East African countries that 
have dispatched troops to Somalia for peace 
enforcement operations, who would prefer to 
build a bureaucratic Weberian state (Fisher 
2018). Nonetheless, in their political engage-
ment with Somali political organizations and 
(especially) their military cooperation with 
the Clan-based units of the putative Somali Na-
tional Army and other security forces, external 
intervenors use the Clan unit as their routine 
organizing framework—a testament to its he-
gemony. While the entities SNM, USC and SPM 
quickly passed into history, they served as ve-
hicles for imprinting their logics of identity and 
territory onto all subsequent political process-




State failure in Somalia was not pre-ordained. A 
slightly different sequence of events could have 
led to a government that could have been rec-
ognized internationally and formed the basis 
for a modest, fraught but nonetheless credible 
process whereby the state was preserved and 
reconstructed. A Clan-based territorial division 
of the country, and a formula for governance 
founded on the ‘4.5’ principle was also not 
pre-ordained. Identity politics and inter-ethnic 
war were probably inevitable on account of the 
way in which the regime used lineage-based 
patronage politics and the opposition mobi-
lized its fighters on the basis of local conflicts, 
and their external relations on appeals to lin-
eage solidarity. But Clan as the dominant orga-
nizing principle was not inevitable.
The civil war period of 1987-92 was a time 
of traumatic and accelerated identity forma-
tion. This had three elements. The first was an 
identifiably modernising process whereby tra-
ditional lineage organization and livelihoods 
were transformed. Open range nomadism 
changed to a demarcated territorial system of 
herding animals primarily for commercial ex-
change, and lineages became militarized. The 
Siyaad Barre regime used lineage-based pa-
tronage and divide-and-rule primarily to frag-
ment internal threats, and in doing so stoked 
the flames of rural insurrection. Those insur-
gencies were structured as vehicles for military 
takeover, their leaders subordinating any sys-
tematic organization of resistance their per-
sonal ambitions. As they persisted, each rebel 
Source: Chatham House
Map 4. Federal Member States
The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 31
organization converged on an ethno-territorial 
unit as a matter of military expediency. Militar-
ily shattered in 1988, the SNM abandoned its 
national agenda and merged into a forum of the 
lineages of its core constituency. Clan formation 
occurred in defeat as a vehicle for the agenda of 
controlling its home territory—a task that the 
dying SNM bequeathed to the Republic of So-
maliland. In the meantime, the SNM’s introver-
sion duly gave birth to the USC, which took the 
same Clan formation logic to the national cap-
ital, which it claimed as ‘its’ territory. The USC 
was a fragile coalition from the outset, united 
only by its leaders’ agreement that it should 
take state power. The USC duly disintegrated, 
but in the meantime the ruinous dynamics of 
political competition among its leaders deter-
mined the fate of Mogadishu, and hence the 
Somali state as a whole. From this emerged a 
fractious, turbulent political system based on 
the trading of allegiances—the political mar-
ketplace that had incubated within the Siyaad 
Barre regime and its systemic corruption.
The external interveners decried clannism but 
recognized that these ‘clans’ were formations 
with which they could work. However, Clans 
were initially formed as vehicles for spoils 
politics, built on ‘clan cleansing’ and primitive 
accumulation. Finding civic representatives of 
Clans and asking them to share power could 
not change this fundamental fact. For the U.S. 
and U.N.-led peacebuilding process, the great 
unmentionable was the inter-communal armed 
conflict, massacre and dispossession that were 
foundational for those units. The prospect that 
such Clan formations could, in some Tillyean manner, make a state through war, was not 
founded on any analysis of whence they came 
or how they were constituted. This paper has 
sought to show how transient, circumstantial, 
localised and contradictory were those pro-
cesses of Clan formation. Although the politi-
cal-military formations of 1991 have long since 
perished of their self-inflicted wounds, their 
ghosts still haunt Somalia.
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